The current situation in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan can generously be described as a clusterfuck wrapped inside a catastrophe and rolled up neatly in a cataclysm. The partition of India in 1947 created the modern countries of India, Pakistan and what would become Bangladesh.

Since 1947, there has hardly been a time when the country has not been in the throes of some sort of crisis or other. There has rarely been a long period of stability among conflicts with India over Kashmir, the civil war in East Pakistan and civil-military tensions. Over the past years, the military has often stepped in and deposed the civilian government, usually on the pretext of restoring order to society.

The present crisis in Pakistan erupted when a court challenge was brought against President Musharraf remaining in command of the army, while at the same time holding the title of president. When President Musharraf won a parliamentary election in early October, the Supreme Court ruled that it had to decide whether or not Musharraf could legally hold both titles.

This challenge to President Musharraf emboldened the opposition parties led by Nawaz Sharif and Benazi Bhutto from exile. Sharif attempted to return to Pakistan in September, but was forced back into exile. Bhutto successfully returned to Pakistan in October.

President Musharraf, facing an emboldened opposition and the possibility of having his election annulled, rolled the dice and declared a state of emergency. The Supreme Court was dismissed, independent television and newspapers were shut down, and the Constitution was suspended. Furthermore, parliamentary elections scheduled for January were postponed indefinitely.

These developments raise questions regarding how the United States should respond to the actions of one of its erstwhile "allies." Should the United States back the intensely undemocratic actions of President Musharraf and continue to give his government aid? Or does the United States bear a responsibility to condemn these actions and push for more democratic reform in Pakistan?

As of right now, President Bush has publicly asked President Musharraf to proceed in a more democratic direction and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has said that aid to Pakistan will be under review. Since then, President Musharraf has reinstated general elections and scheduled them for February. Yet I foresee a couple of problems that may emerge from a transition to democracy in Pakistan.

The main problem is in the increasingly pressing militant situation in the provinces that border Afghanistan. These provinces are under the de facto control of tribal leaders and Islamic extremists. There has been a spate of suicide bombings and confrontations between the extremists and President Musharraf.

The extremists captured more than 200 Pakistani soldiers in August and just last month killed more than 100 people in a failed suicide bombing on Benazir Bhutto's motorcade. Given the split in the more moderate portions of society between the pro-Musharraf faction and the opposition, I worry that a political party with a more extremist agenda could use the split to achieve a significant amount of political power.

While simply supporting the military regime of President Musharraf may keep a cap on extremists in the short term, it doesn't represent a long-term solution to the problem of stability and moderating in Pakistan. This is particularly true now that Musharraf's government seems to have lost a large amount of legitimacy. To truly solve this for the long-term, the moderate elements of society — the opposition parties of Bhutto, Sharif, and the nationalists of Musharraf — need to work together. To this end, the United States should make aid to Pakistan conditional on a transition to a democratic process. The longer President Musharraf delays sharing power, the more appeal extremist elements will have.

Andrew Wagner ([email protected]) is a junior majoring in computer science and political science.