As one of the central issues that helped to decide the outcome of the 2006 mid-term elections, the war in Iraq faces the possibility of imminent change like almost no other issue today. Many predict that with the Democrats taking Congress, their pre-election calls for timetables and withdrawals may soon come to fruition, thus creating a convenient end to a debacle that has plagued the United States for the last three years. Yet, even though the war was entered under specious premises and lacked from the onset a comprehensive strategy for managing post-Saddam Iraq, these facts do not relieve the U.S. of its moral obligation to ensure that Iraq returns to some semblance of normality.

While the Iraq war has undoubtedly been politicized and will undoubtedly stay that way, expedient political outcomes should not become the defining objective regarding strategy. It is necessary to realize that as long as the United States has troops committed in the region, politicians should not create untenable parameters that unjustifiably limit troop action for the sake of gaining political capital. It is essential that Congress and foreign policy objectives take into account the needs and realities of troop conditions in Iraq before making hasty decisions.

The wisdom in the proposition that the U.S. listen to its military commanders in order to make informed foreign policy decisions is self-evident, yet its actual practice has been lacking at best. One of the most circulated news stories of last week was Gen. John Abizaid's testimony before Congress that current troop levels were insufficient to adequately manage an occupation in Iraq. What is unique about his testimony is not the amount of attention it received, but its similarity to a testimony in 2003 by then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki.

In his original statement, Gen. Shinseki estimated that several hundred thousand troops would be needed to secure post-war Iraq, a figure that was called "wildly off the mark" by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. The Pentagon claimed at the time that 100,000 troops would be a sufficient force, an estimate that time and experience has since disproved. After his testimony, Gen. Shinseki was promptly removed from his post and forced into retirement, an example that shows the unwillingness of the administration and political officials to seriously consider external viewpoints regarding Iraq strategy.

The mid-term elections serve as a de facto turning point in Iraq strategy, with Democrats now controlling oversight responsibility. More importantly, they are in a position to express contrary opinions combined with the power to enforce them. While the Bush administration's continued failure in Iraq is what surely propelled some to victory, standing opposed to all current policies would not be the best choice for new congressmen to take.

In order to restore Iraq to a modicum of stability, there must be a comprehensive and robust infrastructure present in Iraq, consisting of a relatively stable democratic process and trustworthy and capable security forces. For this to occur, the military must be granted the resources to stabilize the country, which would allow for the basic formations of the requisite events to cement itself. What many politicians fear is the commitment of more troops to the region, which increases the risk to American soldiers and also appears to extend the length of the occupation. But while this might not be the most favorable outcome, if it is what the military perceives as the most opportune use of resources, politicians must respond to it with the necessary due diligence and open minds.

During this new Congress, it is imperative that politicians make informed decisions and be aware of what the operational repercussions will be. While "victory" in Iraq may no longer be a possibility and current strategy in Iraq is proving fruitless, for the U.S. to abandon Iraq in this state would only create more serious and widespread problems down the road.

Mike Skelly ([email protected]) is a senior majoring in finance and political science.