Cynics might get the impression (perhaps justifiable) that it really doesn’t matter what we say about the proposed changes to University of Wisconsin System Codes 17 and 18 — they’re probably going to pass because that is the way things work in this world. But that really doesn’t change the fact changes are in dire need of a justification that they have not yet received (and, in my humble opinion, cannot receive). In the April 22 editorial published in the Herald entitled “Changes in misconduct policy not draconian,” Associate Dean of Students Kevin Helmkamp attempted to offer a definitive defense of the changes, but the effort only had the ironic effect of exposing the flawed logic and questionable motivations driving the changes.
First, Helmkamp argues, “The current code reads like 1979 more than 2009. Numerous technological and communicative innovations since then require us to update the policy to keep up with the changing scope of student conduct.” This seems fair enough on the surface, but it obscures more than it uncovers. The truth is the particular changes people are up in arms about are not related to these concerns. People wouldn’t be upset about a rather benign effort to change rules to explicitly address the problem of new technologies and modes of communication. But how denying students the right to have a lawyer fully represent them in hearings, relaxing the burden of proof in sexual harassment cases, or denying students the right to appeal the judgment in their cases is even remotely connected to this objective is not articulated. In fact, it cannot be articulated — the only possible justification for this leap is to admit that the purpose of the changes is to make it far easier for the university to punish students. Admittedly, the “keeping the law up to date” spin is much easier on the ears, but it is just that: spin. Forget 1979 or 2009 — I’m worried about the code reading like 1984.
Second, Helmkamp attempts to defend the policy of denying students the right to have an attorney speak for them at proceedings by claiming “when students are forced to confront an accusation, the experience will contribute to their education,” and also by pointing to a “desire to avoid making the disciplinary process litigious.” On the first point, nobody questions the good intentions of a university dedicated to helping educate its students, and this university is obviously one of the better ones at doing that. But when Helmkamp uses the word “education,” he is using it in a sense very alien to friends of liberal education. Indeed, it used to be the case that universities practiced the kind of education Helmkamp is talking about, assuming the right to mold every aspect of its students’ lives, but I was under the impression all but the most religious schools had long ago abandoned this paternalistic attitude on the grounds that it is a bit totalitarian and evinces little respect for individuals. If this is truly one of the underlying motivations of the changes to the code, we ought to be very concerned about where this is all going. Under this idea of education, there is no truth or untruth; there is only power.
On the second point, I can identify with the feeling that we need to take the edge off of the litigiousness of our society. Ironically though, these proposed changes will only exacerbate the problem. Helmkamp tries to soften the far-reaching implications of the changes by reminding us, “If a student feels her or his rights have been violated, students maintain the right to address this in a court of law.” You can bet they will, and they should. Do the authors of the changes really think that they can get away with changing rules so they can “educate” and benevolently punish students (who they apparently regard as children) into good behavior without having students recoil, call their lawyer, and wait for their day in real court? The truth is that it is when you try to bypass justice you create the problem of litigiousness. One of the more predictable consequences of these changes will be a spike in the number of formal legal cases that come out of the whole process.
One of Helmkamp’s rhetorical strategies appears to be focused on the apparently rather innocent change in the language of standards for off-campus misconduct, and he is right to point out that “substantial university interest” must be accompanied by “one or more of the following criteria: the conduct constitutes a serious criminal offense, presents a threat to the health or safety of the student or others, or demonstrates a pattern of behavior that seriously impairs the university’s ability to fulfill its teaching, research or public service missions.” This is a Trojan Horse if I’ve ever seen one. We shouldn’t be fooled; look past this innocent sounding change and see what it is covering up — abridgment of procedural rights — and you see where the real punch of these rule changes is located.
We should not be convinced by Helmkamp’s defense. Dress them up however you might, the proposed changes are an affront to our university community, not a service to it.
Dan Walters ([email protected]) is a graduate student in the political sciences.
