Despite all the detractors and the public outcry, Howard Dean might have been onto something. The United States is operating in a new international environment, where threats to national security no longer originate only from state actors. The emergence of the non-state actor, namely in the form of international terrorism, has vastly changed the way the United States must evaluate its national security readiness. This drastically different international setting requires a modern response and a united front where more people have an influence on shaping national security and Iraq policy.
Last week, Sen. Joe Lieberman, D-Connecticut, moved in this direction with a call for the creation of a bipartisan war cabinet consisting of national security experts and members of Congress. The group, called Victory in Iraq, would act in an advisory role to the Bush administration and help form and review strategies for the war. This move comes largely in response to Lieberman's desire to create a sounder Iraq policy that would garner more widespread support and that could appease both sides' desires for the outcome of the war.
Two initiatives that would be especially benefited by a program such as this would be the systematic withdrawal of American troops and the creation of a comprehensible list of objectives that the United States could accomplish in order to works towards victory. These two initiatives are integral goals that the United States must accomplish to facilitate the stabilization of the region.
At this point, it is necessary to regard the American presence in Iraq not by the decisions made to go there in the first place, but by the effect that the presence is having in the region. The immediate withdrawal of all troops, while strong in moral argument, is too quixotic in that it fails to address the ramifications that this action would have on both Iraq and the region as a whole. Regardless of whether one considers the initial justifications of the war to be dubious or authentic, it is imperative to create the auspices of a long-term stabilization before a total withdrawal is contemplated.
While an immediate withdrawal would not be in the best interests of the United States or Iraq, it is still necessary that a realistic set of goals be drafted that would lead to a situation where a strong American presence is no longer necessary. This is important because without an explicit exit plan, the United States gains the appearance of an occupying power rather than a stabilizing force. This is an appearance that is to be avoided at all costs since it undermines American credibility and casts into doubt the true intentions of both a continuing presence and the initial reasons for going to war.
So how does this all relate back to Howard Dean? His comments regarding the United States' chances of victory in Iraq might have been a little brash initially. But if they are analyzed as an extension of the new international environment, they take on a different type of meaning. Instead of implying that the United States is fighting a losing battle in Iraq, Dean's words can be interpreted to mean that a "victory" will not be the same absolute ending against the terrorist threat. There will be no historic treaty signing, signaling the end of hostilities between America and Islamic extremists.
Rather, what it signifies is that while the United States can accomplish its goals through the creation of an independent Iraqi state, this will not result in an ultimate victory over terrorism. Since the antagonist is an intangible ideology of extremism realized through a disconnected and largely decentralized insurgency, it becomes that much more difficult to smother out. Thus, it is ever more imperative that the United States develop a concrete list of short term objectives that, when fulfilled, can signal the end of the need for a significant U.S. presence in Iraq. And Lieberman's Victory in Iraq might just be the panacea to accomplish just that.
Mike Skelly ([email protected]) is a senior majoring in finance and political science.
