As Vice President Cheney wrapped up his recent tour of the Middle East, he admitted the main topic of discussion with Arab leaders was the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; not Iraq, as Cheney intended.

This is just how the Arab leaders like it.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is incredibly complex, and both sides of the dispute have valid points. But the unwillingness to compromise on many demands has sunk the region into a morass.

Experts frequently lament the refusal of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to accept the unprecedented concessions made by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David in the summer of 2000. But often glossed over is the pressure most Arab countries put on Arafat to reject the deal.

Palestinian supporters both here and abroad complain that the United States is subsidizing Israel and that we should use the influence that accompanies such aid to force Israel to compromise. But truth be told, we have done so. Evidence abounds, including just this past week, when a U.S. scolding and dispatch of an envoy led to an Israeli withdrawal and discussions about a possible ceasefire (talks were interrupted by yet another suicide bombing aimed at civilians).

Unfortunately, the same is not happening on the Palestinian side. The Palestinians receive millions of dollars in aid from Arab countries. The influence of this money was most evident when Arafat was urged to reject the Camp David deal. And this influence is essential to any future compromise. But unlike the United States’ pressure on Israel, Arab countries are not doing their part, and it is doubtful they ever will.

Arab governments have always struggled with legitimacy. Created arbitrarily by the British and French after World War II, most Arab countries have undergone revolutions or coups at some point in the past 50 years, and none are democratic.

The lack of democracy means a lack of legitimization brought by the consent of the governed. The arbitrary creation of many of these countries also means that most Arab leaders cannot draw on tradition to legitimize their reign. When this lack of legitimacy is combined with the poor shape most of these countries are in, it becomes imperative for these leaders to give their people a reason to leave them in charge.

A prominent reason in the ’60s was the promise of a pan-Arab state. Arab nationalism was a strong sentiment among most Arab populations, and Arab leaders played on this fact by continually talking about uniting and actually (and accidentally) following through in two limited and short-lived experiments.

But ultimately, the promise was a hollow one, as Arab leaders had no intention of making the sacrifice of power that would be necessary in a pan-Arab state. When this became clear with the aforementioned collapse of temporary unions, Arab leaders lost the legitimization brought by Arab nationalism.

A second source of legitimization has been opposition to the West in general, and the United States in particular. When Iraq made a deal with the West, the country was ostracized in the Arab world, and the leader who made the deal was soon overthrown. Even today, a source of U.S. frustration with Saudi Arabia is the fact they consider themselves an ally yet encourage the militant brand of Islam that produced most al Qaeda members. The reason is because it turns the people’s attention away from the problems with the regime.

But Arab leaders have gotten more mileage out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than any other. By pushing the issue to the forefront and loudly proclaiming the rights of Palestinians, Arab leaders legitimize their reign to their people. In fact, at least one of the Middle East wars — 1967 — resulted from Arab leaders talking so much they were all but forced to act (and Israel was forced to respond), else their talk would be exposed as being nothing but, well, talk, thus risking the leader’s legitimacy.

Today, after the collapse of Arab nationalism and the allying with the West necessitated by the Persian Gulf War, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is the only legitimizing force left for Arab leaders. Thus, that is all they want to talk about.

Some, like Saudi Arabia’s Prince Abdullah, will even pretend they are trying to do something about it, like when he floated the latest peace proposal. But the proposal included enough non-starters — right of return into Israel for all Palestinians, “peace” instead of normalization — to ensure it will go nowhere.

That is the key. As long as Arab leaders can focus the eyes of their citizens on the conflict in Palestine, the citizens will not notice most Arab leaders have failed miserably in modernizing their countries, relieving widespread poverty, and providing basic freedoms.

Making sure peace does not happen is a matter of self-preservation for Arab leaders. Until Arab governments have a different source of legitimization — such as democracy — it is doubtful peace will arrive in the Middle East.