After the anthrax letters’ scare last year, many virology researchers across the country felt insecure about the publication of their work. Scientists were divided on the issue of publishing sensitive virology research that could potentially be used in acts of bioterrorism.
The possibility of censorship could negatively affect education as well as research at universities, but University of Wisconsin research of sensitive topics such as the anthrax and eboli viruses has been ongoing despite the national debate.
“There is no climate [of censorship] here … people are pursuing the advance of scientific knowledge without undo scrutiny, but anything to be published does undergo a peer-review process,” said Teresa Compton, an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin and part of the peer-revising group for the American Society of Microbiology.
In addition to peer reviews in journals, precautions are also being considered in labs so that research of sensitive material will not have to be classified. Some of these considerations include: licensing agents that are deemed sensitive, facilities in which sensitive research can take place and scientists who are allowed to research the sensitive topics.
These precautions would have severe effects on university research programs because cleaning staff, professors and graduate and undergraduate students are in the buildings where research takes place
The struggle to balance security concerns with the freedom of information became a national conflict after a study on agricultural bioterrorism earlier this year. The report found the United States was remarkably unprepared to counter an attack against domestic livestock and crops.
Although the White House Office of Homeland Security determined the report contained no classified data, the report was withheld from the public indefinitely in an effort to keep potentially dangerous information away from U.S. enemies.
If reports published in journals are even partially censored, the scientific community cannot replicate the results. This replication and study of other’s work is the foundation of the modern scientific process, and the potential censorship of this material has upset many in the scientific community.
Another concern raised by this issue is how “sensitive information” is defined. Although ongoing virus research is not technically “classified,” some feel it could be used in terrorist attacks.
“Anything on viruses could be used by terrorists; it is just where you draw the line,” said Compton.
On the opposite end of the debate lies a study published last year in the Journal of Virology. The report detailed ways in which researchers attempted to use a relative of smallpox, called mousepox, to render previously vaccinated mice infertile. Researchers were surprised to find the result of their virus study was not a new contraceptive, but the discovery of a genetically engineered version of mousepox that would kill even the vaccinated mice.
To some people, the publication of this report seemed to provide a convenient instructional booklet for enterprising terrorists, but the sentiment of many researchers at UW is that the best defense against anthrax or any other infectious disease is information.
“The problem is that most materials used in bioterrorism aren’t rocket science, and the techniques used to make the agents are basic biology,” said Alta Charo, a professor of law and medical ethics at the UW. “But it is the research that falls into the same category of looking for a better bug, that will find a cure.”
