Discussions are heating up over the option of the international community imposing a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace as a way to protect rebels and civilians from aerial attacks by the Qaddafi regime. Key political figures in the United States, including the president, secretary of defense and several senior senators, have begun to openly debate the merits of the idea.

While much has already been written on the promises and dangers of a proposed no-fly zone, a few important points have been under-explored in the discussion.

First, several observers have argued that the threats by President Obama and America’s NATO allies (and NATO would carry out these strikes as Russia will surely veto UN Security Council efforts to enforce a no-fly zone) are meant to put pressure on Qaddafi or encourage further defections from Qaddafi’s forces. Yet, if the purpose is the former, such a threat presumes there is a rational cost-benefit calculation taking place in the mind of Qaddafi.

That could be the case, but at this point, what does Qaddafi have to lose? He has already been promised international ostracism and an International Criminal Court indictment. Threats are likely to only further his desperation, which will increase the unpredictability of his behavior (if that is possible). The related danger is that more harm could come from threatening a no-fly zone as a bargaining tactic than not moving to implement it. In other words, do not let it appear that Qaddafi has called the international community’s bluff if these threats are indeed a bluff.

If the purpose is to encourage defections, it is hard to imagine that Qaddafi’s forces (especially mercenaries who are not Libyan) do not already know they are set against the international community. Indeed, even prior to the no-fly threats, reports suggested that at least some, although not all, Libyan pilots are already “defecting” by bombing empty buildings and areas where few rebels or civilians are located. Thus, they appear to be carrying out orders although their sympathies lie with the rebels. Further threats of a no-fly zone do little to change the defection dynamics which were playing out long before the no-fly threats emerged.

These are not reasons to refrain from a no-fly zone, just cautions against issuing hollow threats. Two more words of caution are in order. First, the no-fly zone would be logistically difficult. Not impossible by any stretch, but this is not analogous to Bosnia, Kosovo or post-Gulf War Iraq as has been asserted by many. In each of those cases, the geographic area to be patrolled was smaller. Also, Bosnia and Kosovo were in NATO’s backyard, while in Iraq, there was already a significant forward deployment of US forces. In addition, NATO and the US had far better intelligence in those conflicts regarding who was fighting, where there was fighting, and who was on what side. The Libyan situation is far more fluid and getting intelligence is more difficult.

Second, the recent pro-democracy revolutions in the Middle East have not been aided by outside forces. And while rebels in Libya have now approved of an internationally-led no-fly zone, the consequences of receiving this outside help could make a post-transition Libya difficult to govern.

Let’s assume, for example, that the no-fly zone shifts momentum completely to the rebels as is usually presumed. Post-Qaddafi, there will still be a need to govern those groups who have remained loyal to the colonel. The losing tribes will have to be convinced they will fare decently under a new regime or they will continue an armed struggle, either directly or in a guerilla-style campaign. Outside intervention might increase the chances of an armed struggle, since the narrative of the conflict will be: “without the international community, we would still be fighting and possibly winning.” Thus, once international military involvement ends, the armed struggle could continue. And given that no one is arguing for a concerted military effort to degrade Qaddafi’s forces’ other military capabilities (e.g., small arms and light weapons) there is no reason to believe a bloody war of some type would not re-emerge later.

So should NATO refrain from any involvement in Libya? Not necessarily. Even given the preceding arguments, the bloodshed and humanitarian crisis may grow so dire that these risks are worth taking. In such a scenario, it will be important to have the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity at the table to lessen the perception that it is only the “West” that has input on policy. The international community must do what it can to stop the violence in Libya. But it must also be mindful that unintended consequences of external intervention tend to be the norm, not the exception.

Jon Pevehouse ([email protected]) is a political science professor at UW-Madison.