Applying her knowledge of game theory, a University of Wisconsin professor is helping the U.S. government to fight the War on Terror.

Vicki Bier, a UW industrial engineering professor, has created a model based on game theory to determine what the "optimal" defense and resource allocation strategies are for Homeland Security.

"When determining how best to allocate defenses, we know the terrorist or attacker is going to observe our defensive strategies and adopt their strategies accordingly," Bier said during a phone interview from College Station, Texas, where she is working on another Homeland Security project.

The basic idea behind game theory is — in any situation — that each side will do the best it can to achieve its goals while working under the assumption that its adversary will, too.

Using her game-theory model, Bier said, the U.S. government should announce its defense strategies publicly in many — but not all — situations.

Though Bier said this strategy might be "counter-intuitive" to traditional military thought, she believes it often has a win-win result.

"If terrorists do attack, we reduce the chances of success because we've invested in defense," Bier said. "The defenses are also effective in deterring an attack."

Bier said that if terrorists know a potential target will be defended, they will be discouraged from attacking it.

However, Bier noted that publicly announcing defense plans is "not always beneficial" and is the "biggest weakness" she is working on to remedy in her model.

Another conclusion of the game-theory model, according to Bier, supports a recent Department of Homeland Security policy of focusing defense and security resources on major targets in major cities.

Bier said that defense resources, until recently, were beginning to be spread out "thinner and thinner" to less attractive targets in smaller states — such as Iowa, Alaska and Montana — because of "pork-barrel politics."

Though Bier believes her model cannot prove smaller states are less attractive targets overall, it does say the probability of an attack is low enough to focus more funding on larger, more prominent targets.

"Rural states have targets that need to be protected, like city hall, a football stadium or a nuclear power plant nearby," Bier said, but added that the majority of resources should be "focused on specific assets known or believed to be high risk."

Bier said she began working on her model before Sept. 11, but it was not until after that day that it "struck [her] at the intuitive level" that many of the defense strategies being proposed at the time "did not make sense" in terms of investment strategies.

According to Bier, the "80-20 rule" was — and is — most often used by defense strategists when determining how to allocate resources.

The "80-20 rule" essentially states that if 10 problems exist, funding should be allocated to tackling the eight problems that can be dealt with at the cheapest cost first, then allocate funding to the two more expensive problems.

Bier said she realized the flaws of this rule on a trip to Disneyland.

"I was struck to realize they were searching people's purses and backpacks, but did not search strollers and baskets at the bottom of strollers," Bier said. "Any terrorist worth his salt … could figure out to put something in the baby stroller."

Steve Robinson, another UW professor of industrial engineering, who works with Bier on a variety of Homeland Security projects at UW, said standard defense reliability and "think patterns" are based on natural disasters. He said his and Bier's research has worked to get away from that idea.

"Nature is not going to change based on what you do," Robinson said. "But terrorists will."

Bier's game-theory model research team was based at the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events — or CREATE — at the University of Southern California.

Robinson said CREATE is funded at a level $4 million a year for three years, $250,000 of which has gone to UW, according to Bier.