The new decade has already been one filled with controversy surrounding the hot-button issue of animal experimentation on campus.
First was the release of a report by federal animal welfare inspectors which found 20 violations of federal animal welfare laws and regulations at UW. Worst among these violations was the finding that UW-Madison researchers had, on five separate occasions, not sufficiently shown they had attempted to find alternatives to painful experiments on animals. Running a close second was the inspectors’ observation of three dogs in UW labs suffering severely following procedures, two of which were vomiting and unable to produce urine, but which were not receiving attention from veterinarians.
Provost Paul DeLuca, on behalf of the University Administration, courageously responded by spinning the federal inspectors report as being, “…for the most part very positive…” I’ve never been more proud of my university’s administration.
More notably though, UW gave the closest thing it ever has, and probably ever will, to an endorsement of an official position on the morality of experimenting on monkeys. The committee’s eventual position — that compliance with the existing laws and regulations equals ethical behavior — was almost surely a foregone conclusion. More than $46 million in research grants flowed into UW last year for experiments on the more than 1,900 primates housed on campus. I severely doubt such interests would have been forfeited to take a stand on a muddy ethical question.
But, while the committee’s position may have been predetermined, that does not make it philosophically incoherent. The federal laws and regulations which now make up the university’s position do amount to a type of moral system. What kind of a system? Regardless of what Eric Sandgren, the man charged with overseeing animal research on campus, may say, it is not one of strictly “utilitarian” flavor. And thank God for that.
However, it is a moral system with serious utilitarian underpinnings. What does that mean? In this sense, it basically means we can experiment on monkeys if it will result in a societal benefit which outweighs the harm we do to the animal. Sounds like something you can get behind, doesn’t it?
Most people would say so. I think the better answer is more like, “yes and no.”
In a letter to infamous local animal rights activist Rick Marolt, Chancellor Martin wrote that experiments on primates meet this utilitarian balancing test when experiments are tailored to “…understanding the causes and developing treatments for the most devastating of human medical conditions.” And yet, Marolt can turn around and point to experiments done on monkeys at this very university, supposedly guided by that very philosophy, in which vitally important portions of monkeys’ brains were destroyed by researchers to see if the monkeys slept better or worse as a result.
The fact is almost all human beings are speciesists. We irrationally favor and empathize with the interests of our own species over others, and as a result give ourselves greater moral standing. It sounds weird, but it’s true. Think about it: it is a scientific and psychological fact that the advanced primates in question can commonly be mental equals to human beings with serious mental impairments. They appear to experience essentially the same emotions, pain and level of cognitive process. And yet, while we don’t think twice about experimenting on our closest evolutionary ancestors, we are repulsed by the idea of doing anything of the sort to humans.
I point this out not to advocate for the abolition of experimentation on non-human primates necessarily, nor to say that humans are no different than apes. But only to argue such human tendencies have created a situation in which, by falsely downplaying the harm we do to these animals, we have been too lenient with justifications for experimentation. Yes, it may be ethical to experiment on non-human primates, but only in much stricter circumstances than we previously thought.
Our views on this issue have real and immediate consequences. Every time we choose to buy the cheapest ground beef or chicken breasts at the grocery store, we acquiesce to a world in which animals are subjected to an existence in which the only time they may walk outside of a cage only slightly larger than their body may be on their way to slaughter.
Similarly, if we wholly support our university’s current position on primate experimentation, we acquiesce to a world in which portions of primates’ brains may be removed to study REM cycles. It is my hope, and general idea, that very few of us would wish to knowingly contribute to such a world.
Alec Slocum ([email protected]) is a senior majoring in philosophy and legal studies.
