If the ongoing debacle in Iraq isn't proof enough that the Bush Administration's Global War on Terror lacks an overarching strategy or is simply a front for transforming the world to its liking, look no further than the inadequate efforts in Afghanistan since the overthrow of the Taliban.

After all, if this effort is truly about eradicating terrorist threats that have and will pose threats to the American people, Afghanistan and Pakistan should unquestionably constitute the focus. The two countries connected by the Khyber Pass remain the base for the organization al-Qaida, which has been responsible for the vast majority of major terrorist attacks against Americans since they began occurring with some regularity in the 1980s. These countries are also still called home by the Taliban, the militant Islamist collective and onetime Afghan government, and welcomed them with open arm(ament)s.

The Taliban has spent the past few years rebuilding around Quetta, Pakistan, under the auspices of President Pervez Musharraf's government and are quietly but quickly becoming a force to be reckoned with in southern Afghanistan. Currently, NATO forces are locked in fierce battles with the clan in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. And, in a recent "Foreign Affairs" article, professor Barnett Rubin warns that "in some areas, there is now a parallel Taliban state, and locals are increasingly turning to Taliban-run courts, which are seen as more effective and fair than the corrupt official system." A return of the Taliban to power will most likely lead to Afghanistan once again becoming a terrorist stronghold.

Why does Afghanistan seem to be sliding back into its status quo of upheaval and civil war? The answer is twofold: The United States' post-invasion efforts to produce a functioning state have been wholly insufficient, while its concessions to "frienemy" Pakistan have been exorbitant and dangerous.

The current upheaval is largely borne from the bad shape that the country is in. Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest states; according to the International Monetary Fund, its per capita gross domestic product of $300 is slightly less than that of economic powerhouses such as Uganda and the Gambia. The difficulties caused by financial woes have been compounded by a recent spike in HIV cases and a near-complete lack of the rule of law. In fact, perhaps the only sector of Afghan society that is flourishing, save the Taliban, is the opium industry, which is estimated to have achieved record output in 2006.

Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to be a dubious ally in the effort to fight Islamist terror and bring stability to Afghanistan. Granted, President Pervez Musharraf has done an admirable job of performing the most difficult of balancing acts, simultaneously appeasing a domestic populace largely sympathetic to the cause of Islamist fighters and the American superpower that wishes to destroy them. However, the fact that his government has continually aided al-Qaida allies such as the Taliban and warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar should be sufficient to convince the Bush Administration that the United States needs to take a more active and less trusting role in the region.

The U.S. war plans in Afghanistan never seem to have included nation building. The initial invasion was carried out by a few thousand U.S. Army Special Forces aided by American air power; because of this, there were few boots on the ground afterward to keep the peace and aid the new Hamid Karzai-led government. There are approximately 50,000 U.S. and NATO troops there now, but as the situation has deteriorated considerably, they will likely be spending their time fighting militants rather than, say, establishing an effective police force. Also, while the United States has contributed significant aid, Afghanistan's lowly economic status testifies to its being insufficient, inefficient, or both.

Unfortunately, the potentially catastrophic situation in Iraq may disallow the United States from allocating enough resources and effort to pacify Afghanistan. However, it is important that Afghanistan is given equal attention, because it has proven to be the most dangerous nexus of Islamist terror in recent times, and there is little reason to think that it would not regain that status with a renaissance of Taliban control. Also, the United States must question how valuable a quasi-ally such as Pakistan really is and whether it is excessively dangerous to trust it with monitoring both the Taliban and al-Qaida in the areas in which these groups are strongest.

I do not wish to see a further intensification of our nation's belligerent behavior, but if we are serious about controlling terror worldwide, the growing Afghan fiasco should not be swept under the Global War on Terror's rug.

John Sprangers ([email protected]) is a sophomore majoring in political science and international studies.